We use different organizational forms of REITs (internally-advised versus externally-advised) as a natural experiment to devise a clean test of the impact of hold up versus benefits in relationship banking. Due to regulatory reasons, externally advised REITs have lower information opacity and consequently are less subject to hold up effect. Contrary to hold up and consistent with benefits accruing to borrowers, we find that the relatively more opaque internally advised REITs derive greater benefits from lending relationship for both price (loan rate), and non price terms of loan contracts (collateral, covenants and loan size). Further, relationship banks of internally advised REITs have a higher likelihood of securing repeat business from such REITs providing further evidence of the benefits of relationship lending.
Key words: Lending relationship; hold-up effect; Real Estate Investment Trust; organizational form; loan contract terms
JEL classification: G20, G32, L22, L23
자료실
자료실
[2014년 제 4차] Hold-up versus Benefits in Relationship Banking: A
작성자 : 관리자
조회수 : 1038
게시일 :
2014-12-12