We find that both investment and compensation policies become less efficient following seasoned equity offerings. During the year of SEO and the following year, the shareholder return-to-investment sensitivity decreases, the likelihood of overinvestment increases, and acquisition announcement returns decrease. At the same time, top officers’ and directors’ compensation increases, their pay-for-performance sensitivity decreases, and firm value decreases. These post-SEO changes are significantly related to investor reactions at the time of SEO announcements. Our results are based on publicly-listed Chinese firms over the period 2000 to 2012, which experienced exogenous regulatory
shocks on the eligibility to issue SEOs. The shocks allow construction of instruments to address endogeneity issues. Our findings imply that SEO proceeds, on average, are used unproductively for shareholders and provide private benefits to management.
Keywords: Equity Issuance, Corporate Investment, Managerial Compensation.
JEL Classifications: G32 G34
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자료실
[2014년 제 4차] How are Proceeds from Seasoned Equity Offerings Use
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2014-12-12